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Outmezguine v. State: 
ABSENCE OF 
SCIENTER ELEMENT 
UNDER STATE'S 
CHILD PORNOGRA-
PHY STATUTE IS NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT. 
In Outmezguine v. State, 
335 Md. 20, 64] A.2d 870 
(1994), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland upheld the State's 
child pornography statute which 
strictly prohibits the photo-
graphing or filming of a minor 
engaged in an obscene act or 
sexual conduct. Inafive-to-one 
decision, the court determined 
that the statute neither required 
the State to prove scienter nor 
required a defendant so pros-
ecuted to assert a reasonable 
mistake of age defense. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that 
the State's child pornography 
law is not violative of the First 
Amendment. 
Elan Outmezguine was 
convicted of violating Maryland 
Annotated Code Article 27 § 
419A(c) ("§ 419A(c)"), which 
provides: "Every person who 
photographs or films a minor 
engaging in an obscene act or 
sexual conduct ... is subject to 
[a fine of not more than $25,000 
and/or ten years imprison-
ment.]" Md. Ann. Code art. 27, 
§ 419A(c) (1957). Having de-
nied Outmezguine' s motion for 
judgment of acquittal, the trial 
judge similarly refused each of 
the four proposed jury instruc-
tions submitted by Outmezguine, 
which would have required 
scienter as an element of the 
offense. Thereafter, the trial 
judge accepted the jury's find-
ing that Outmezguine unlaw-
fully photographed a 15-year-
old high school student. As a 
result, Outmezguine was sen-
tenced to eight years imprison-
ment. 
Finding no error, the 
- -- --~ "-
- - -
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the decision 
of the trial court. Subsequently, 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land granted certiorari to con-
sider whether scienter is a re-
quired element of the offense of 
photographing or filming a mi-
nor under § 419A(c) and 
whether Outmezguine waived 
his right to appellate review on 
the issue of a mistake of age 
defense. 
Before addressing these 
questions, however, the court 
confronted the threshold issue 
of whether § 419A(c), operat-
ing as a strict liability crime, is 
constitutional under the First 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The court first 
considered § 419 A( c) in light of 
the overbreadth doctrine, a 
mechanism designed to protect 
First Amendment expression 
from laws so broadly written 
that they would have a chilling 
effect on individuals taking ad-
vantage of such expression. 
Acknowledging the po-
tentially chilling effect such a 
strict liability child pornogra-
phy statute might have, the court 
began by balancing the right of 
freedom of expression against 
the right of the state to protect 
children against sexual exploi-
tation. ld. at 36, 641 A.2d at 
878. In so doing, the court 
determined that the protected 
speech in this case would most 
likely not be chilled if § 419 A( c) 
is indeed interpreted to be a 
strictliabilityoffense.ld. at36-
37,641 A.2d at 878. Remark-
ing that the statute would only 
be invalidated if it were found 
"substantially overbroad," the 
court held that it is not an 
unreasonable burden for a pho-
tographer or filmmaker to as-
certain the true age of the indi-
vidual being photographed or 
filmed. Id. at 37, 641 A.2d at 
878. 
The court likewise de-
termined that the value of the 
constitutionally protected ex-
pression in this case is minimal. 
Id. at 37, 641 A.2d at 879. Such 
de minimis value becomes ap-
parent upon weighing the value 
of such expression against "the 
State's unquestionably ... sig-
nificant interest in protecting 
children ... and in prohibiting 
the use of children as subjects in 
pornographic material." Id. Es-
sentially, the court held that the 
resulting minimal chilling effect 
on producers must necessarily 
be sacrificed as it is not "sub-
stantial". Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 
879. 
Having considered the 
strict liability issue, the court 
further considered whether the 
First Amendment requires 
scienter as an element of a § 
419 A( c) offense and whether a 
reasonable mistake of age de-
fense must be available to de-
fendants prosecuted under 
Maryland's child pornography 
law. After examining each is-
sue, the court found that: 1) the 
First Amendment does not re-
quire scienter as an element of 
the offense and 2) a reasonable 
mistake of age defense need not 
be afforded defendants pros-
ecuted under § 419A(c). Id. 
In addressing scienter 
and the imposition of criminal 
culpability for violations of child 
pornography laws, the court 
relied on New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747 (1982). Id. at 35, 
641 A.2d at 877. In Ferber, the 
court emphasized that states 
have a compelling interest in 
protecting minors and thus can 
regulate the production or dis-
semination of child pornogra-
phy. Id. at 35, 641 A.2d 877-
878 (paraphrasing New Yorkv. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). 
Moreover, although the court 
of appeals held that "criminal 
responsibility may not be im-
posed for violations of child por-
nography laws without some 
element of scienter on the part 
of the defendant," it neverthe-
less provided that "[t]his 
scienter requirement ... does 
not refer to knowledge of the 
minor's age." Id. at 40, 641 
A.2d at 880. The court con-
cluded that, rather than the age 
of the minor, scienter "refers 
to knowledge of the 'nature and 
character' ofthe materials pro-
duced ... [hence], § 419A(c) 
satisfies this requirement be-
cause a defendant photographer 
must have knowledge that he or 
she is taking pictures of sexual 
conduct as defined in § 416." 
Id. 
Additionally, upon its 
analysis of Maryland's child 
pornography statute under the 
facts of Outmezguine, the court 
of appeals exercised statutory 
interpretation to "ascertain and 
effectuate legislative intent." Id 
at 41, 641 A.2d at 880. In so 
construing § 419A(c), the court 
considered the statute's plain 
language in its entirety to deter-
mine the intent of the legislature 
in enacting this law. Recogniz-
ing that both subsections (b) 
and (c) of § 419A include a 
scienter element, the court held 
that a plain reading of §419 A( c) 
revealed its silence as to whether 
the State must prove the defen-
dant had knowledge of the 
minor'sage. Id. at41, 641 A.2d 
at 881. Yet, such an omission 
"was not without purposeful 
design." Id. at 44,641 A.2d at 
882. 
In addressing such pur-
poseful design, the court rea-
soned that the legislature at-
tempted to impose criminality 
based upon the perpetrator's 
active versus passive involve-
ment in the world of child por-
nography. Impliedly, the court 
opined that subsection (c)'s at-
tack on individuals who actively 
exploit children by photograph-
ing and/or filming them resulted 
in the legislature's deliberate 
and purposeful omission of 
knowledge of the child's age as 
an element of the crime. 
The court concluded its 
analysis by considering the ap-
propriateness of the mistake of 
age defense under § 419A(c). 
Specifically, the court deter-
mined the constitutionality of 
placing the burden of produc-
tion on the defendant to raise 
the issue of mistake of age. The 
court ultimately held that 
Outmezguine failed to meet such 
burden of production and, like-
wise, failed to elucidate the 
record in this regard. Specifi-
cally, the court reasoned that 
"Outmezguine's argument that 
'I did not know how old she 
was' [was] insufficient to gen-
erate the issue of reasonable 
mistake of age in this case." Id. 
at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. Thus, 
the court held that the issue of 
reasonable mistake of age was 
not properly preserved for re-
VIew. 
In upholding § 419A( c), 
Outmezguine v. State takes the 
dangerous position of permit-
ting criminal convictions under 
Maryland child pornography law 
without requiring the State to 
prove scienter as an element of 
the offense. Understandably, 
the court seeks to protect chil-
dren from the cruelty of sexual 
exploitation by punishing those 
who engage in child pornogra-
phy. Yet, to do so at the ex-
pense of impending upon a 
defendant's First Amendment 
rights is far more burdensome 
than the court should allow. 
Such overbearing interpretation 
of § 419 A( c), as is articulated in 
Outmezguine, renders chilled a 
defendant's rights under the First 
Amendment and compels a re-
formed analysis of the statute. 
Hence, despite the State's sig-
nificant interest in protecting 
children, the court's interpreta-
tion of § 419A(c) invites such 
unnecessary infringement of a 
defendant's First Amendment 
rights that Outmezguine remains 
ripe for appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
- Lisa Y. Johnson 
